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## Defensive Urbanism in Modern Conflicts: The Case of Ukraine

**Abstract.** This paper examines the influence of dense urban development on modern military conflicts, with a focus on Ukraine. The research highlights how urban form dictates the dynamics of combat operations, restricts troop mobility, and shapes tactical decisions. Historical models of fortified cities are considered, as well as contemporary examples, including Israel's urban planning paradigm. The paper argues that Ukraine must adapt its state-building standards to incorporate defensive urbanism and resilient infrastructure. Recommendations for integrating urban planning with defense strategies are provided.

**Keywords:** urban planning, defensive urbanism, fortress cities, Ukraine, military strategy

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### Introduction.

In modern conflicts, the built environment acts not only as a backdrop for military operations, but also as an active force that shapes tactical options for attack or defense. In Ukraine, dense urban development in the Donbas, as well as in cities such as Kherson, Kharkiv, and Mariupol, dictates the pace of war and troop movements.

This essay explores how dense urban development has influenced military operations in Ukraine, contextualizing the discussion within both a historical framework and contemporary tactical analysis. Given the ongoing geopolitical threats from Russia, it is imperative that Ukrainian state-building standards incorporate methods drawn from global best practices, including those implemented in Israel.

### Problem Statement.

Dense urban development fundamentally changes the dynamics of combat operations, imposing unprecedented restrictions on mobility. In Ukrainian regions such as Donbas and key cities such as Kherson, Kharkiv, and Mariupol, the urban form has had a dual effect. On the one hand, the complex network of streets and multi-level buildings can serve as natural fortifications and strongholds for defenders. On the other hand, high density often increases the risk of collateral damage, complicates evacuation and supply efforts, and sometimes creates attractive targets for

rapid enemy advances. The urban environment complicates traditional military maneuvers. In the narrow corridors of residential neighborhoods or the labyrinthine industrial zones of Donbas, troop movements are restricted, and heavy armored vehicles are vulnerable to close. Urban terrain forces commanders to employ tactics aimed at minimizing impact, such as the use of small mobile units and sniper teams, and to rely on high-precision countermeasures rather than brute force. This phenomenon is particularly noticeable in the dynamics of the conflict in Donbas. Since 2014, when the war nearly paralyzed the region's urban population, and later in 2022, the pace of troop advances has been largely dependent on the density of urban development. In response to these challenges, innovative approaches have emerged, such as the use of existing underground structures and the adaptation of buildings for defensive positions. In addition, the dense concentration of civilian infrastructure in these urban areas creates serious ethical and pragmatic constraints. Military operations must be carefully calibrated to minimize civilian casualties while achieving tactical objectives. The experience of Ukrainian defenders highlights this dilemma; urban combat requires almost surgical precision to avoid humanitarian crises. [5]

### Main Material and Results.

Kherson has historically developed as a strategic port and shipbuilding center, and its development has

been closely linked to its role as a fortress city. Its industrial past and subsequent urban evolution have resulted in an anthropogenic environment that combines both open spaces (intended for trade) and dense residential neighborhoods. During the escalation, the enemy's rapid advance exploited loosely defined perimeters, especially in the suburbs, where the absence of reinforced barriers allowed for a quick breakthrough. [5]

Kharkiv, known for its mix of Soviet modernity and historic architecture, presents a contrasting urban challenge. The city's internal urban structure, characterized by wide boulevards adjacent to residential neighborhoods, allowed for a relatively better defensive position. However, its wide urban areas and sprawling suburbs proved decisive in determining how enemy forces could or could not encircle the city. [5]

The prolonged siege of Mariupol and its eventual capture by enemy forces illustrate the destructive potential of intense urban conflict. The complex network of industrial complexes, residential neighborhoods, and wholesale markets provided the enemy with numerous tactical opportunities. While defenders used density to prolong resistance and delay the advance of troops, the enemy systematically shelled key nodes such as transport corridors and important industrial facilities to isolate and ultimately overcome defensive positions. This case study is instructive for urban planners: without deliberate design for resilience and modular defense, densely populated urban areas can quickly become a liability in modern warfare. [7]

The defensive potential of urban spaces can be maximized if planning includes elements such as reinforced perimeters, controlled access points, and backup networks for critical infrastructure. In future urban development, especially in cities near the border with Russia, it is important to integrate military elements into urban planning. These adaptations will increase the resilience of cities against rapid enemy advances and improve the safety of the civilian population and key infrastructure.

### **Discussion.**

One of the most instructive examples of integrating urban planning with national defense is the Israeli model. In Israel, urban regulations, building standards, and zoning laws have evolved not only to promote efficient living or aesthetics, but also to serve as a bulwark against potential invasion and terrorism. Israeli cities are often characterized by a strategic network of streets, fortified public buildings, and zoning regulations that deliberately create buffer zones around critical areas. Israeli regulatory practice requires that buildings in areas near border regions use construction methods that include blast integrity, redundancy, and rapid evacuation routes. For example, city centers are designed with wide thoroughfares that serve both civilian and military logistical needs, and critical facilities such as hospitals, government buildings, and communications centers are often built underground or within structures that combine both

aesthetic and resilient characteristics. In many ways, the Israeli planning paradigm is the blueprint for modern fortress cities. Their approach has not only minimized casualties in conflicts, but also significantly disrupted enemy operational planning, forcing adversaries to conduct more costly and slower mobile operations in urban environments.

In addition to Israel, the United States uses Department of Defense documents (such as UFC 1-200-01) that outline detailed structural requirements for buildings in high-risk environments, including resistance to explosive forces and enhanced fire safety measures. NATO also emphasizes the need for critical infrastructure resilience, especially in contested regions. These documents provide technical guidance on strengthening structures, ensuring that urban design not only serves aesthetic or economic functions, but also contributes to national security.

### **Conclusions.**

In any country under constant military threat, the strategic placement of critical infrastructure is of paramount importance. The destruction or damage of key facilities, from transportation networks to energy facilities, can undermine both the civilian economy and military capabilities. Events in Ukraine underscore this reality.

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, one of the largest in Europe, has become a symbol of the challenges faced by the deployment of critical infrastructure in disputed regions. Its location, originally chosen for logistical and economic reasons, now represents a strategic vulnerability. Terrorists have repeatedly shelled the perimeters around the nuclear power plant, creating the specter of a nuclear accident. The threat of meltdown or explosion from damaged nuclear facilities complicates urban warfare by adding the threat of potential environmental catastrophe. Therefore, future urban planning in conflict-prone regions should not only emphasize defensive architecture, but also take into account the spatial distribution of such critical facilities, incorporating buffer zones and special protective perimeters.

Similarly, the Kakhovka Reservoir, which has witnessed episodes of deliberate destruction aimed at undermining water security, demonstrates how attacks on vital infrastructure can have a cascading effect on national stability. When critical infrastructure is located in city centers or suburban areas, an enemy may have the opportunity to target these nodes, causing massive disruptions to both civilian life and military operations. Therefore, the integration of defense principles into urban construction is not limited to fortifications and street planning, but should also extend to infrastructure systems. Modern urban planning should include resilient, decentralized models for critical services that remain functional even during an attack. In countries where military doctrine and urban planning have been successfully integrated, backup systems, alternate routes, and modular construction principles have proven important for maintaining critical infrastructure capabilities. This approach not only strengthens the

urban landscape, but also reduces the risk of cascading failures that can occur when infrastructure nodes are surrounded.

As Ukraine faces a constant military threat, the future of its urban landscapes depends on how new cities are built. The concept of fortress cities is not new, but it requires innovation in the modern era. The key is to develop cities with inherent defensive advantages while ensuring their viability for civilian life. Modern tactical analysis shows that the most effective urban defenses are those that slow enemy advances by complicating lines of sight, blocks, and communication networks. In such an environment, urban density can be used as a defensive asset if complemented by smart, adaptive urbanism. For example, creating multi-layered perimeters around new facilities in Donbas with controlled access points and built-in redundancy would significantly complicate rapid enemy attacks.

Future cities in Donbas, built according to the principles of "defensive urbanism," should be equipped with a network of sensors, surveillance systems, and rapid response channels that are integrated into the urban fabric, creating a "smart defense" system that supports both urban planners and commanders on the battlefield. Buildings and public areas should be modular, allowing for rapid reinforcement or adaptation during times of crisis. Critical systems (utilities, communications nodes, transportation) should be distributed throughout the city to prevent single points of failure. City planning should support both civilian and military functions. For example, public squares and corridors can serve as gathering points for defense forces in emergencies.

The future Ukrainian city, especially in areas adjacent to hostile borders, should be designed as a fortress that is not only resilient but also adaptable to changing tactical conditions. Urban areas should be designated in such a way as to maximize natural and man-made protective barriers. For example, buffer zones can be established along vulnerable perimeters with limited development. Based on the Israeli model and recommendations from the US Department of Defense, new building codes should introduce higher standards for blast resistance, structural integrity, and the ability to rapidly deploy protective modifications. City authorities and military planners should collaborate from the outset of any urban development

project, ensuring that every new city or settlement in disputed territory is designed with dual-use functions. Road networks and transportation hubs should be planned with contingency routes to ensure rapid mobilization of defense forces while protecting the flow of civilians. By rethinking the built environment in Donbas as a network of interconnected fortress cities, Ukraine can transform its urban vulnerability into a powerful strategic asset that not only delays enemy advances but also actively promotes national sovereignty in the face of constant military threats.

The above analysis demonstrates that dense urban development significantly affects the pace and course of military operations. Densely populated urban areas, while conducive to civilian economic and cultural life, pose serious challenges for mobile warfare. The complex built environment of Ukrainian cities has repeatedly slowed the enemy's advance, but it has also exposed peripheral vulnerabilities.

The evolution towards fortress city concepts is urgently needed, especially for cities adjacent to the Russian border. The development of new urban centers in Donbas offers a promising opportunity to design cities from scratch as fortified, multifunctional outposts. These cities of the future should use modern tactical analysis, smart defense networks, and resilient architectural designs to deter enemies.

As Ukraine continues to face a constant military threat, it is crucial that urban planners, architects, and military strategists work together to rethink the design and function of urban centers. Integrating the principles of defensive urbanism into all aspects of planning—from government building standards to the placement of critical infrastructure. Ukraine can transform its cities into resilient fortress cities. This interdisciplinary vision not only promises to delay and complicate enemy advances, but also protects civilian life and ensures that the urban landscape becomes a bastion of national strength in an era of geopolitical instability. We have the opportunity to set an example on the international stage by demonstrating how urbanism and military strategy can intersect to create an environment that is both livable and secure. Innovative fortress cities are not only a defensive necessity but also a vital investment in the future sustainable development of Ukrainian society.

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## Оборонний урбанізм у сучасних конфліктах: приклад України

**Анотація.** У статті досліджується вплив щільної міської забудови на сучасні військові конфлікти, зокрема в Україні. Показано, як форма міста визначає динаміку бойових дій, обмежує мобільність військ та впливає на тактичні рішення. Розглянуто історичні моделі міст-фортець, а також сучасні приклади, зокрема ізраїльську парадигму міського планування. Стаття доводить, що Україні необхідно адаптувати державні будівельні стандарти для впровадження оборонного урбанізму та створення стійкої інфраструктури. Надано рекомендації щодо інтеграції міського планування з оборонними стратегіями.

**Ключові слова:** урбаністика, оборонний урбанізм, міста-фортеці, Україна, військова стратегія

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